Art Lounge — Sales by channel

January 1 – June 18, 2026 · all four channels · all three warehouses · source: Unicommerce (live), Google Ads, Meta Ads

Bottom line. The half-year is healthy — ₹3.77 Cr invoiced, peaking in March–April. May dipped on wholesale reorder timing (a few big accounts; June is tracking back toward ~₹70L), not lost demand. The biggest unused growth lever is simply keeping our bestsellers in stock — they're out about half the time.
Invoiced revenue YTD
₹3.77 Cr
Jan–Jun 18 (Jun partial)
Peak month
₹81.9L
March
May
₹57.0L
−29% vs Apr
June: so far → projected
₹33.8L → ~₹70L
18 days invoiced → full-month estimate
Ad spend YTD
₹20.4L
Google + Meta

All revenue is invoiced sales — open/unshipped orders are excluded. Older months are fully invoiced; May and June still have orders in the pipeline (shown as a separate line below).

Monthly revenue by channel

Total B2B Online Retail Store Marketplaces · Jun 1–18 (solid) = invoiced so far; Jun proj (dashed) = full-month estimate
Channel (₹L)JanFebMarAprMayJun 1–18*
B2B (wholesale)36.047.154.755.527.420.4
Online (website)12.214.813.915.817.510.0
Retail Store (KG)8.94.013.08.911.83.2
Marketplaces0.90.20.20.40.30.2
Total invoiced58.066.181.980.657.033.8
open orders (not yet invoiced)0.20.31.40.97.610.5
June projected (full month)~71

*June shows two things: ₹33.8L invoiced in the first 18 days, and a ~₹70L full-month projection (the chart's dashed line) once open orders ship and the rest of the month lands. Jan–May are invoiced actuals (revenue = dispatched/delivered line items, tax-incl, post-discount, ex-shipping); they're fully invoiced (<2% open). May still has ₹7.6L of orders to invoice as well.

Why ~₹70L is a reasonable June estimate, not a guess: it's mostly orders already in hand — ₹44.3L placed in the first 18 days (₹33.8L invoiced + ₹10.5L shipping). Across Jan–May the first 18 days captured ~62% of the full month on average, so ₹44.3L ÷ 0.62 ≈ ₹71L (≈₹70L after the ~2% of orders that never invoice). June's first-half pace also sits between May's (which finished ₹65L) and April's (₹83L), pointing to the same range. The swing factor is B2B order timing — a realistic range is ₹62–75L.

Why May fell: 5 accounts, not the market

The ₹28.0L B2B drop (Apr ₹55.5L → May ₹27.4L invoiced, −51%) comes from a handful of large accounts that didn't reorder — not broad weakness. The customer base actually grew, and part of May's gap is orders still in the pipeline.

B2B customers
114 → 122
Apr → May (+8)
Top 5 accounts
82%
of the entire May drop
Top 10 accounts
>100%
of the drop — the rest of the base grew

Biggest pullbacks (April → May)

AccountAprMayChange
HS Enterprises₹7.13L₹0−₹7.13L
Hindustan Trading Company₹7.58L₹1.86L−₹5.72L
Computer Gallery₹5.28L₹0−₹5.28L
Harsh Enterprises₹6.29L₹3.38L−₹2.91L
Artzo India₹2.06L₹0.01L−₹2.05L

Offsetting gains & new accounts

AccountAprMayChange
A N Commtrade LLP₹1.29L₹2.36L+₹1.07L
Jain Sons Stationery (new)₹0₹0.96L+₹0.96L
Mango Stationery Pvt. Ltd.₹0.33L₹1.17L+₹0.84L
Artistmindz Pvt. Ltd. (new)₹0₹0.75L+₹0.75L

Invoiced basis matters here: an earlier all-orders view showed 8B-ArtHub as a new ₹1.47L gain and A N Commtrade up ₹5.42L — but 8B-ArtHub is an open, unshipped order (₹0 invoiced) and ₹4.3L of A N Commtrade's May is still in the pipeline. Counting only invoiced sales removes that noise.

Verdict: lumpy wholesale, not demand erosion. Big distributors bulk-bought in April and skipped May; the dealer base still broadened (114→122) and new accounts came on. Because it's reorder-timing, the pullback should reverse as those accounts re-order — and some of May's gap is simply orders not yet invoiced.

Paid media — efficiency held, and the May spend spike was deliberate

Ads drive Online, not wholesale B2B — so judge spend against Online revenue, not the total. On that basis efficiency held all year: a steady 20–27% of Online. May's ~₹1L of extra spend was a deliberate budget turn-up — and the two platforms split: Meta paid off, Google didn't.

Online revenue (₹L, left) Total ad spend (₹L, right)
₹LJanFebMarAprMayJun 1–18
Google Ads1.661.621.751.832.511.44
Meta Ads1.331.361.561.792.161.35
Total ad spend2.992.973.313.624.672.79
Online revenue (invoiced)12.214.813.915.817.510.0
Spend % of Online — invoiced24.5%20.1%23.8%22.9%26.7%27.9%
— same, vs Online orders placed (like-for-like)24.1%19.2%22.7%21.5%25.1%22.9%
% of Online revenue % of total revenue (reference)
Reading the June 27.9% right — it's a measurement quirk, not an efficiency drop. Paid media is running at ~22%, normal. Same reason the faint "% of total revenue" line spikes in May–June: a lower invoiced denominator, not more ad spend. Judge paid media on the Online line.

The May spike: Google over-scaled, Meta didn't

The ₹1.05L increase was budget turned up, not rising ad prices. (ROAS = return on ad spend: ₹ of sales per ₹ spent.)

GoogleJanFebMarAprMayJun¹
Spend ₹L1.661.621.751.832.511.44
Clicks31.8k37.2k33.7k41.9k57.5k27.6k
Avg CPC ₹5.224.345.214.374.375.22
Conv. rate3.5%2.3%2.9%4.1%3.4%2.3%
ROAS²4.7×6.7×5.2×6.5×5.1×4.0×

Google: spend +37% and clicks +37% at an identical ₹4.37 CPC = budget turned up, not auction inflation. But conversions rose only +12%, so conversion rate fell 4.1%→3.4%, cost-per-order rose ₹106→₹130, and ROAS slid 6.5×→5.1×. The extra third of clicks was colder traffic.

MetaJanFebMarAprMayJun¹
Spend ₹L1.331.361.561.792.161.35
Impressions1.42M1.52M1.57M1.79M2.16M1.08M
CPC ₹3.192.703.043.153.434.88
ROAS³2.933.372.262.603.403.37

Meta: spend +21% with CPC up only modestly (₹3.15→3.43), and purchase ROAS actually improved 2.6→3.4 — its best since February. Meta's scale-up paid for itself; Google's didn't.

Why didn't sales rise to match the spend? Three reasons: (1) the increase was mostly Google volume (+37% clicks) into diminishing returns — far less added conversion than the spend implies; (2) Online, the part ads drive, did rise (+11% to ₹17.5L invoiced), just slower than the +29% spend; (3) the total looked flat only because B2B wholesale fell at the same time, and ads don't drive B2B. Action for June: hold Meta, trim Google back toward its ₹1.8L / 6.5× sweet spot rather than chasing volume.

¹ June 1–18. ² Google on-platform reported conversion value ÷ cost (overstates true store ROAS; useful for trend). ³ Meta reported purchase ROAS.

Stock availability — the biggest hidden lever

One number tells the whole story. Our single biggest product sold 16 units a month while out of stock, then 5,996 in the first month we restocked it — same product, same price, same demand. The only thing that changed was whether it was on the shelf. And we're out of our best products about half the time, leaving a standing ceiling on revenue every single month.

Best-sellers in stock
~half the time
top (A-class) SKUs, on a typical day
One restock, one product
+₹7.8L
Koh-i-noor eraser, the month it came back
Cash to fund the fix
₹3.96 Cr
already on the shelf as dead stock

One product, two scenarios — Koh-i-noor eraser (SKU 6312, our #1 product)

Scenario A · what happened — OUT of stock
~16 units / month
Jan–Mar: 28, 7, 14 units. Off the shelf, the demand had nowhere to go.
Scenario B · what demand implied — IN stock
5,996 units in month 1
Restocked in April; ~84–100/day when available — roughly ₹7.8L in one month. The demand was there all along.
Koh-i-noor eraser, SKU 6312Scenario A — out of stockScenario B — in stock
PeriodJan–MarApr onward
Units sold per month~165,996 → 2,101 → 1,240
Daily run-rate when sellingnear zero~84–100 / day
Revenue that month (~₹130 each)~₹0.2L~₹7.8L
What was different?Nothing but the stock. Same product, same price, same demand.

Sales don't lead availability — availability leads sales. The gap between the two columns is demand we already had and simply couldn't fulfil.

Out of stock In stock (restocked)
Koh-i-noor eraser units: Jan 28, Feb 7, Mar 14 (out of stock), Apr 5996, May 2101, Jun 1240 (restocked).

The cliff is the whole point: three flat bars near zero (out of stock), then a near-vertical jump the moment it's restocked in April. Same product throughout — the flat bars on the left are revenue we left on the table.

It's not one lucky SKU — the pattern repeats every time

ProductWhile OUT of stockThe month it was IN stock
Koh-i-noor eraser (top SKU, ~₹130)Jan–Mar: ~16 / monthApr: 5,996 units (~₹7.8L)
Edding markerMarch: 0 unitsApr: 2,400 units
Royal Talens (whole brand)5 of 6 months: 01 month: 2,793 — its entire half-year

Royal Talens sold its entire half-year of volume in the single month it had stock. Across our top brands, monthly sales track monthly availability almost one-for-one (correlation 0.7–1.0).

…and the stockouts land squarely on the winners

Our top-tier (A-class) SKUs are in stock only about half the days. The highest-demand lines are far worse: Winsor & Newton, Royal Talens and Claessens canvas heroes sit in stock under 10% of the time — W&N's top brush line, on its own worth ₹6.2L of sales, was available just 21 of 168 days.

% of selling range out of stock now brand-level figure (understates it)
Out of stock now, by brand: Liquitex 62%, Camlin 43%, Jacquard 41%, Daniel Smith 39%, Holbein 31%, W&N 18% overall.

Share of each brand's selling SKUs out of stock right now. W&N's 18% overall is misleading — its bestsellers specifically are 80–95% out. The products that actually sell are out far more often than the brand average suggests.

The twist: we're not short on stock — we're short on the right stock

While the winners sit empty, ₹3.96 Cr is frozen in dead stock — 4,250 SKUs, a third of all in-stock value, unsold for 90+ days (Favini ₹64L, the slow W&N tail ₹55L, Lana, Schut, Pebeo). So this isn't a cash or warehouse problem; it's a mix problem: we're out of the winners and overstocked on the losers — often inside the same brand. Winsor & Newton is at once our most stocked-out bestseller brand and our #2 dead-stock brand. The money to keep fast-movers in stock is already paid for — it's just sitting in the wrong products.

The one move: rebalance the shelf. Liquidate the dead lines and redeploy that cash into depth on proven fast-movers. The payoff is immediate and measurable — one restock turned ~₹0.2L/month into ~₹7.8L (Koh-i-noor, 16 → 5,996 units), and because stockouts hit the high-velocity B2B SKUs hardest, this is also the cleanest lever on the wholesale topline. On a conservative, B2B-skewed read the recurring miss runs into tens of lakhs a month.

Keep one distinction clear: this is the standing ceiling on every month, not the cause of the May dip. Availability is roughly constant month to month — the bestsellers that were in stock kept selling through May. May fell because a few large wholesale accounts didn't reorder (demand), not because of stock. Fixing the shelf raises the ceiling for every month going forward.

What the half-year says

Two different things move this business — don't confuse them. Wholesale reorder timing sets the month-to-month swings (it's why May dipped, and it self-corrects). Stock availability sets the ceiling on what any month can reach (chronic, and fixable).

What happened

What to do

Generated 18 June 2026 · Revenue = invoiced sales from Unicommerce (live, all facilities; line items dispatched/delivered, net of discount); open/unshipped orders excluded. Ad spend from Google Ads & Meta Ads (Art Lounge India, INR). Stock from the inventory system's production data (current to 17 Jun, all three warehouses; units × MRP). June figures are 1–18, invoiced to date. ₹L = lakh, ₹Cr = crore.